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Abstract: 
This paper examines theoretically and empirically the role of political risk guarantees, 
which bilateral investment treaties serve, in debt accumulation in low and middle 
income countries. The paper empirically finds that signed bilateral investment treaties 
with OECD countries have a positive influence on total and guaranteed debt 
accumulation, under system GMM and OLS estimation methodologies. Results 
suggest that the role of bilateral investment treaties extends beyond attracting FDI to 
international lending.  
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Beyond FDI: 
The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Debt 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis, which started with the US subprime crisis in 
February 2007 and spread to many European countries - Iceland, Belgium, Latvia, 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, and Spain - over the past five years, has created 
a squeeze in the supply of capital in international financial markets in general and in 
capital flows to low and middle income countries in particular.
2
 The squeeze in capital 
flows was more obvious in debt flows than in foreign direct investment flows. Debt 
flows to low and middle income countries were more than halved between 2007 and 
2009, while FDI flows were much less volatile, as the financial crisis literature 
predicts (Agenor 2003; Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann 2001; Stiglitz 2000).
3,4
 
The sustainability of large capital inflows to emerging markets is one of the 
major challenges that the global economy faces in the aftermath of the crisis, as 
Carmen Reinhart clearly pointed to in her keynote address “A Decade of Debt” to the 
2012 INFINITI conference.
5
 In fact this challenge is very relevant to the conference 
theme: “International Finance towards 2020:  Will the next 10 years be different?”  
In order to be able to sustain large capital inflows, in particular debt flows, to 
emerging markets, it is important to understand what mobilized debt flows over the 
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 See the Council on Foreign Relations for a timeline of the global financial crisis 
(http://www.cfr.org/economics/timeline-global-economy-crisis/p18709). 
3
 In low income countries debt flows declined from nearly $10 billion to about $4 billion and even 
recorded outflows of $3 billion in 2010. In middle income countries debt flows declined by three 
quarters from $536 billion in 2007 to $136 billion in 2009 before reversing the trend in 2010 and 
increasing to $440 billion. FDI flows to low income countries maintained the same level of $10-12 
billion between 2007 and 2009 before increasing to about $15 billion in 2010. In middle income 
countries FDI flows increased from $453 billion in 2007 to $551 billion in 2008 before declining to 
about 70 percent of its level in 2009 before increasing afterwards. 
4
 See also Chuhan et al (1996) and Sarno and Taylor (1999) as in Agenor (2003). 
5
 She also highlighted inflationary pressures, overheating and bubble risks as challenges for emerging 
markets. Public and private debt overhang, deleveraging, lower growth and high unemployment are 
highlighted challenges for advanced economies. 
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past three decades, given two important observations. First, more than 80 percent and 
about 40 percent of low and middle income countries debt stocks, respectively, in 
2005-2010 is guaranteed. Second, many low and middle income debtor countries have 
contracted bilateral investment treaties with other countries, including creditor or 
creditors’ governments, which guarantee against government expropriation of foreign 
investment including foreign debt.  
The aims of bilateral investment treaties are threefold (Ginsburg 2005; 
Hallward-Driemeier 2003; Mina 2009; Neumayer and Spess 2005; UNCTAD 1998). 
First, it establishes clear, simple, and enforceable rules for foreign investment 
protection from expropriation by the two contracting countries. Foreign investment 
protection under many treaties comprises foreign direct investment, portfolio 
investment, and debt. Second, it identifies the circumstances under which 
expropriation takes place and the compensation standards. Third, it establishes 
investment dispute settlement mechanisms in presence of imperfect domestic property 
rights protection institutions.  A bilateral investment treaty therefore guarantee the 
property rights of partner country investors, reduce host country political risks, and 
thereby increase foreign investor's confidence and promote capital flows.
6
 
In conceptualizing and examining the determinants of debt flows, it is important 
therefore to consider the presence of “double guarantees”: Payments to creditors of 
low and middle income countries are not only guaranteed by the borrowing or 
borrower’s government – credit risk guarantee, but are likely guaranteed of political 
risk as well.
7
 In presence of the double credit and political risk guarantees, two 
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 Contracting bilateral investment treaties also reflects countries’ intent to financially integrate into the 
global economy at the bilateral level. At the multilateral level, this intent is reflected in membership of 
the multilateral World Trade Organization (WTO). 
7
 It might be the case that the debtor government has not contracted bilateral investment treaty with the 
creditor or creditors’ government, but with other similar governments. 
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questions arise.
8
 First, by serving as political risk guarantee, do bilateral investment 
treaties encourage debt flows to developing countries?
9
 In other words, do creditors 
respond to political risk guarantees that bilateral investment treaties provide? Second, 
since creditors primarily care about credit risk, we would expect creditors of 
guaranteed debt to be less responsive to bilateral investment treaties than creditors of 
non-guaranteed debt. Accordingly, do bilateral investment treaties have more positive 
influence on non-guaranteed debt as opposed to guaranteed debt? 
This research contributes to the literature on international capital flows and 
bilateral investment treaties in one main respect. The treatment of property rights 
protection in the institutions literature has been incomplete. Studies have tended to 
concentrate on domestic institutional functions and ignored government efforts to 
adopt international treaties, namely bilateral investment treaties, to improve property 
rights protection and provide political risk guarantees. The paper accounts for this 
gap, while examining the determinants of debt flows in low and middle income 
countries.  
Second, the paper conceptualizes the impact of bilateral investment treaties on 
international lending building on the literature on government guarantees of banks. 
We conceptualize that bilateral investment treaties influence international lending 
through a) the impact on financial institutions in general and banks in particular, b) 
the design of treaties to primarily encourage FDI, c) promoting competition among 
countries to contract treaties, and d) financial contagion. This has not been done 
before to the best of our knowledge. 
                                              
8
 The availability of sovereign credit ratings on very few low income countries hinders raising a third 
question: do bilateral investment treaties generate standardized perception of political risk guarantees 
among creditors, regardless of the income level of the contracting country? In other words, do bilateral 
investment treaties contracted by middle income countries have more positive influence than those by 
low income countries? 
9
 Developing countries include both low and middle income countries. 
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of three 
relevant strands in the literature - the determinants of capital flows, and the effect of 
guarantees on risk taking and crises, and the impact of bilateral investment treaties on 
FDI. It then conceptualizes the mechanisms through which bilateral investment 
treaties impact international lending. Section 3 posits an optimization-driven 
empirical model following Wei and Wu (2001). Section 4 proposes the estimation 
methodology in light of the empirical issues. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature survey 
2.1. Determinants of capital flows and role of institutions 
 
 The determinants of capital flows have been extensively examined in the 
capital flows literature. Some studies, such as Brana and Lahet (2010), Calvo et al 
(1996) and Fernandez-Arias (1996), have distinguished between the external/push 
factors and the domestic/pull factors. Calvo et al (1996) explain capital flows of the 
1990s in terms domestic and external factors to the recipient economy. External 
factors to the recipient economy include declining world interest rates, which improve 
creditworthiness and reduce default risk in developing countries, global business 
cycle, integration of world capital markets and diversification of investments 
internationally and contagion effects. Recipient economy domestic factors include 
sound domestic monetary and fiscal policies, and trade and capital market 
liberalization. Similar to Calvo et al (1996) Fernandez-Arias (1996) argued that the 
decline in world interest rates improved creditworthiness and reduced default risk in 
developing countries, and therefore perceived capital flows a result of the interaction 
between external push factors and domestic pull factors. Recently, Brana and Lahet 
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(2010) expand the set of push factors in four Asian economies in 1990-2007 to 
include contagion variables - monsoonal effect, spillover effect and shift contagion - 
as defined by Masson (1999). 
 Recent studies, such as De Santis and Luhrmann (2009), Fratzscer (2012), 
Hooper and Kim (2007), and Papaioannou (2009), have focused on the role of 
institutions and political risk as domestic factors in attracting capital flows.
10
 
Fratzscher (2012) explores the drivers of global portfolio investment flows using high 
frequency mutual funds data for the period 2005-2010 differentiating between 
financial crises and the subsequent recovery, and between common global shocks and 
country-specific factors.
11
 He finds that during crises there is a strong divergence in 
capital flows across countries with dynamics of capital flows primarily driven by safe-
haven flows. He also finds that the effect of global shocks, in particular during the 
recovery period, was heterogeneous and depended on the recipient country’s 
institutional quality, country risk, and the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals 
and policies. He contends that, “countries are far from innocent bystanders that are 
powerless in being exposed to volatile global markets, and that indeed they have tools 
to insulate to some extent their economies from adverse global shocks” (p 2). 
 Hooper and Kim (2007) examine the role of operating environment opacity 
in influencing FDI, portfolio investment, and international bank lending.
12
 They argue 
that opacity in general discourages capital flows. However, with the profit 
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 Other studies, which examine the influence of property rights protection on foreign direct investment 
and portfolio investment, include Alfaro et al (2008), Asiedu (2006), Busse and Hefeker (2007), Daude 
and Fratzscher (2008), Daude and Stein (2007), Du et al  (2008), Faria and Mauro (2009), Mishra and 
Daly (2007), Naude and Krugell (2007), and Wei (2000). Studies on international lending include 
Kraay and Nehru (2004), Lane (2004), Mina (2011), Mina (2006), and Mina and Martinez-Vazquez 
(2006). The empirical evidence of these studies suggests that better domestic institutional functions 
encourage capital inflows and tilt the capital structure of countries towards equity and away from debt. 
11
 He focuses on common global liquidity, risk, and macroeconomic news shocks. 
12
 They use Price Waterhouse Coopers’ opacity index covering corruption, legal, economic, 
accounting/reporting, and regulation opacity as well as aggregate opacity. 
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opportunities it creates, opacity may increase capital flows. For example, 
multinational corporations (MNCs) may concentrate on FDI to exploit accounting and 
reporting opacity in order to maximize profit. Other forms of capital flows may 
respond differently to accounting opacity. 
 Interestingly they point out that opacity in corruption might increase FDI or 
international bank lending.  Corruption opacity can increase MNCs likelihood of 
obtaining loans, which are government guaranteed, or favorable tax treatments, thus 
increasing FDI flows to the country. Corruption opacity might take the form of 
government guarantees of crony capitalists’ international loans, increasing the 
likelihood of obtaining loans and thus international bank lending. In contrast, legal 
opacity reduces contract enforcement of property rights protection and thus capital 
flows in general. 
 In explaining the Lucas (1990) paradox on why capital flows from poor to 
rich countries, contrary to the neoclassical model prediction of capital flowing in the 
opposite direction, Papaioannou (2009) focuses on the role of institutions in 
explaining these flows and finds that weak institutions – weak property rights 
protection, inefficient legal system and high risk of investment expropriation – deter 
banking flows. Similarly, in examining the role of demographic structure in 
international portfolio flows, De Santis and Luhrmann (2009) find that lower quality 
institutions deter net portfolio inflows explaining the capital reallocation from 
developing to developed countries. 
 In summary this section identifies three messages. First, political risk 
matters for capital flows. Poor institutions and high risk of investment expropriation 
deter both bank loans and portfolio flows. Second, institutional quality, country risk, 
and the strength of macroeconomic fundamentals and policies matter for insulation 
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and recovery from global shocks. Third, the literature has not considered government 
efforts to strengthen property rights protection and reduce political risk, through 
bilateral investment treaties, and their influence on international lending. 
 
2.2. Effect of guarantees on risk taking and crises 
  
This section weaves the literature on the effect of guarantees on financial 
institutions, in particular banks, risk taking behavior and on financial crises. In doing 
so, we aim to gain an insight into how bilateral investment treaties, through political 
risk guarantees, might affect financial institutions’ international lending decisions. 
Government guarantees affect bank risk taking behavior through two opposing 
channels (Gropp et al 2012). On the one hand guarantees reduce market discipline and 
creditors’ incentives to monitor bank risk taking, and therefore generate more bank 
risk taking. On the other hand they increase banks’ charter or franchise value.13 A 
government guarantee increases the present value of future profits, resulting in higher 
opportunity cost of closing down. In order not to forego future profits, banks would 
reduce risk taking. Whether guarantees at the firm level result in more or less risk 
taking depends on the strength of each of these two opposing forces.      
In the financial crises literature, government guarantees may prevent bank 
runs if credible (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; Laeven and Valencia 2008), or may be 
unsuccessful in enhancing or restoring public confidence (Honohan and Klingebiel 
2003; Kane and Klingebiel 2004; Laeven and Valencia 2008). Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) find that banks’ foreign liabilities are insensitive to blanket guarantee 
announcement. Foreign investors continue withdrawing resources even after a 
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 A charter value is the present value of bank’s future profits, which the bank foregoes if it closes 
down (Guttentag and Herring 1983). It arises from market power, bank efficiency and reputation 
(Demsetz et al 1996). 
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guarantee is in place since the cost of country exit decreases with asset availability to 
them under blanket guarantees. 
Under fixed exchange rate regimes government guarantees to banks’ foreign 
creditors can result in twin currency and banking crises through their impact on the 
composition of banks’ assets and liabilities (Burnside et al 2004). Guarantees may 
encourage banks to adopt un-hedged currency risk and default on foreign debts and 
declare bankruptcy when devaluation is imminent. Guarantees may result in fiscal 
costs and future moral hazard problems, if governments are committed to honor these 
guarantees (Laeven and Valencia 2008). If governments are unwilling or unable to 
fund government guarantees costs through fiscal reforms, however, they may resort to 
seigniorage revenues. Government guarantees of banks’ foreign liabilities may result 
paradoxically in banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2002).
14
  
 
2.3. Impact of bilateral investment treaties on international lending – 
conceptualization of mechanisms  
Bilateral investment treaties serve as guarantees against political risk and 
thereby encourage foreign investment. Bilateral investment treaties, as mentioned in 
the introduction, a) establish clear enforceable rules for the reciprocation of foreign 
investment protection between the two signatory countries from the risk of investment 
expropriation, b) identify the circumstances under which investment expropriation can 
take place and the associated compensation standards, and c) establish investment 
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 In preventing twin banking and currency crises, Burnside et al (2004) argue that the most obvious 
strategy is to commit to financing bank bailouts without resorting to seigniorage revenues. However, 
given the commitment difficulty, they suggest alternative strategies: a) to use foreign reserves to fend 
off speculative attacks; b) impose a Tobin tax on exchange rate transactions; c) strengthen prudential 
regulations and banks capital requirements; d) dollarize the economy; and e) obtain alternative party 
bailouts. Whether bilateral investment treaties, as a commitment mechanism against political risk 
which is associated with sovereign risk, reduce the likelihood of currency and banking crises is the 
subject of this research’s future extension. 
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dispute settlement mechanisms, which facilitate foreign investment in the presence of 
imperfect domestic property rights protection institutions (Ginsburg 2005; Hallward-
Driemeier 2003; Neumayer and Spess 2005; UNCTAD 1998).  Studies, such as Egger 
and Pfaffermayr (2004), Neumayer and Spess (2005), and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 
(2006), found a significant positive impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI.
15
   
 The overall perception of bilateral investment treaties serving as a guarantee 
against political risk and encouraging FDI may be applied, albeit carefully, to 
international lending. On the one hand, government guarantees of domestic banks 
reduce market discipline and creditors’ incentives to monitor bank risk taking, and 
therefore generate more bank risk taking. On the other hand, by increasing the charter 
value of banks, government guarantees increase the opportunity cost of closing down, 
and thus reduce risk taking. The net effect on risk taking depends on the strength of 
each of these two opposing forces.  
The first mechanism through which bilateral investment treaties may affect 
international lending is through their impact on financial institutions in general and 
banks in particular. By reducing political risk, bilateral investment treaties may 
encourage foreign creditors to extend more lending to the contracting country’s 
borrowers or borrowing government. Bilateral investment treaties may reduce 
monitoring of the contracting country government as well as its borrowers, and 
generate moral hazard. In this case bilateral investment treaties may encourage 
international lending and lengthen its maturity. On the other hand, by raising 
creditors’ charter value and opportunity cost, bilateral investment treaties may 
discourage creditors from lending.    
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 The influence of bilateral investment treaties on FDI has also been examined in Desbordes and 
Vicard (2009), Egger and Merlo (2007), Hallward and Driemeier (2003), Kerner (2009), Mina (2009, 
2012), and UNCTAD (1998). 
11 
 
 The second mechanism lies in the institutional or legal design of treaties. 
Being primarily designed to protect and encourage FDI, bilateral investment treaties 
may tilt the composition of capital flows in favor of equity as opposed to debt. This in 
turn may reduce the likelihood of banking crisis – a macroeconomic risk, which may 
encourage future international lending. 
Competition among countries to sign bilateral investment treaties to attract 
international lending may reduce the level and/or share that a country can attract - a 
third mechanism.
16
 Recognizing the benefits of bilateral investment treaties, countries 
may compete against each other to sign treaties with other higher income countries to 
be able to attract higher level and/or share of world capital flows. In other words, the 
competition to sign bilateral investment treaties and reduce political risk manifests 
itself in an increasing competition for international lending. The proliferation of 
bilateral investment treaties may theoretically result in the opposite outcome, if the 
determinants of international lending are the same across signatory countries. 
Therefore the competition among countries to sign bilateral investment treaties can 
paradoxically reduce some countries’ shares and levels of international lending. 
The fourth mechanism through which bilateral investment treaties may affect 
international lending is financial contagion. Bilateral investment treaties may generate 
financial contagion among creditors - the other side of the market - in the event of 
crisis along the lines of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). For example, a group of 
middle income countries may sign treaties with an OECD country and compete for 
bank loans. If one of these countries experiences a crisis, the bank may reduce its 
exposure to other middle income countries, possibly triggering a reduction in other 
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 We assume all factors are held constant. 
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banks’ lending – a financial contagion. Therefore, bilateral investment treaties may 
dampen foreign investors’ opinions about risk and thus generate contagion.  
 In summary, we conceptualize that bilateral investment treaties influence 
international lending through their impact on financial institutions in general and 
banks in particular, their design that primarily encourages FDI, the resulting 
competition among countries to contract treaties, and financial contagion. We leave 
the empirical examination of each of these mechanisms or channels for future 
research.  
 
3. Empirical model and data  
  Empirical model specification builds on Wei and Wu (2001), who examine the 
effect of corruption on FDI. Their empirical model is motivated by a simple 
optimization problem solved by a multinational firm. Similarly, we can conceptualize 
a foreign creditor (bank) optimization problem in which it selects the level of loans it 
extends to borrowing countries, j=1,…,N, that maximizes its profit π. The 
optimization problem can be expressed as: 
  ∑[(          ) (  )     ]
 
   
 
where   is foreign creditor’s profit,    is the rate of government expropriation of 
foreign investment,    is the rate of political risk guarantee on a dollar of lending,    
is the rate of default on loans,    is the stock of loans the foreign creditor extends to 
the borrowing or borrower’s country, and   is the creditor’s cost of loanable funds.17  
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      and   relate to the borrowing or borrower’s government. 
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  The optimal stock of loans a foreign creditor extends to a country j thus 
depends on the borrowing country’s rate of government expropriation of foreign 
investment, the rate of political risk guarantee a country provides through the bilateral 
investment treaty it contracts, the rate of loan default, and the cost of loanable funds 
to the foreign creditor or deposit interest rate.   
   [           ] 
where 
  
  
  , 
  
  
  , 
  
  
  , and 
  
  
  . 
 The empirical model expresses, in principle, the stock of foreign loans (L) as: 
 
ln(Li,t)= β0 + β1 ln(Li,t-1) + β2 Gi,t + β3 Pi,t + β4 Di,t + β5 Ii,t + β6 Mi,t + εi,t  (1) 
where L, G, P, D, and I are as defined above but in capital letters, and Mi,t is the cost 
of exclusion from international capital markets, and ε an error term.18,19 The subscripts 
i and t are country and time indicators. 
 L is the stock of external debt owed to nonresidents, which comprises public 
and publicly guaranteed (PPG) and private non-guaranteed (PNG), the use of IMF 
credit, and short-term debt. Both PPG and PNG are long-term in nature. PPG 
comprises the external obligations of public sector, or private sector whose debt is 
guaranteed for repayment by a public entity.
20
 PNG comprises the external obligations 
                                              
18
 Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) estimates the level of international debt using the cost of debt default, the 
level of income, the growth rate of income, population size, and the real level of public debt. Cost of 
debt default arise from embargoes on future lending and is measured by exports variability and the 
ratio of imports to GNP. The level of income and income growth rate are measured by GNP and GNP 
growth rate, respectively. 
19
 Initially we considered a vector of explanatory variables, which includes the degrees of economic 
and financial development, as measured by real GDP per capita and private sector credit relative to 
GDP, in this vector. However, these two variables are captured in sovereign credit rating, and together 
with investment profile and FDI flows explain about 36 percent of the variation in the rating.    
20
 The public sector includes the general government, monetary authorities, and public corporations. A 
public corporation, financial or nonfinancial, is subject to control by government units, where control 
over a corporation is defined as the ability to determine general corporate policy by choosing 
appropriate directors, if necessary. Control can be established through government ownership of more 
than half of the voting shares or more than half of the shareholder voting power (including through 
14 
 
of private debtors, which are not guaranteed for repayment by a public entity. Short-
term debt comprises all debt of original maturity of one year or less and interest in 
arrears on long-term debt.
21
 L is measured in current billions of U.S. dollars. More 
details on PPG and PNG debt are provided in the following section. 
 The rate of government expropriation of foreign investment, G, is proxied by 
ICRG’s investment profile component of the political risk index. Investment profile 
refers to the risk of investment expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment 
delays.
22
 The rate of political risk guarantee P is proxied by the total number of 
bilateral investment treaties signed with OECD countries. The rate of default on loans, 
D, is measured by Standard and Poors’ foreign currency sovereign credit rating.23 
Foreign currency, as opposed to local currency, is selected based on Kim and Wu 
(2008), who find that foreign currency long-term ratings stimulate all types of capital 
flows the most, while local currency long-term ratings discourage them. Cost of 
loanable funds, I, is measured by the 12-month Euro dollar LIBOR. The cost of 
exclusion from international capital markets, M, is proxied by the percentage of 
imports of goods and service to GDP. 
 We should note that S&P’s sovereign credit rating is based on five scores: 
political, economic, external, fiscal, and monetary. The political score measures 
institutional effectiveness and political risks, which intuitively include the risk of 
investment expropriation, G. Empirically, as mentioned in the footnote above, 
                                                                                                                                 
ownership of a second public corporation that in turn has a majority of the voting shares), or through 
special legislation, decree, or regulation that empowers the government to determine corporate policy 
or to appoint directors. The publicly guaranteed private sector external debt component of PPG is 
defined as the external debt liabilities of the private sector, the servicing of which is contractually 
guaranteed by a public entity resident in the same economy as the debtor. Private sector external debt, 
which is not contractually guaranteed by the public sector is classified as PNG. Chapter 5 of 
International Monetary Fund (2003) provides a detailed definition of the public sector. 
21
 Short-term debt comprises money market instruments, loans, currency and deposits, trade credits, 
and other debt liabilities mainly arrears. 
22
 The risk of investment expropriation, G, will be dropped from the empirical model, as explained 
below.   
23
 A description of S&P sovereign credit rating system is provided in Appendix A.   
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investment profile, together with real GDP per capita, private sector credit relative to 
GDP, and FDI flows, explain nearly 40 percent of the variation in the sovereign credit 
rating. Thus we decide to drop G from equation 1. 
Data on debt stocks are obtained from the World Bank’ World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Data on bilateral investment treaties signed with OECD countries 
are calculated based on UNCTAD data. Data on sovereign credit ratings are obtained 
from Standard & Poors’ (S&P) sovereign foreign currency credit ratings. S&P’s credit 
ratings are transformed into numerical scores, as explained in Appendix A. Cost of 
loanable funds is measured using the 12-month LIBOR on Euro dollars, which is 
obtained from the Wall Street Journal website.
24
  Data on the percentage of imports of 
goods and services to GDP are obtained from WDI. 
Series differ in their sample periods and countries. At the time of writing this 
paper, data on debt stocks, and the percentage of imports of goods and services to 
GDP are available until 2010, bilateral investment treaties until June 2012, and 
sovereign risk ratings until 2012. Data on the 12-month Euro dollars LIBOR are 
available since (September) 1989. However, S&P sovereign credit rating data vary 
widely across countries. In addition, S&P ratings are available for 58 countries, of 
which 53 are middle income countries. Periods which ratings cover vary by country 
restricting the number of observations to about 700 and creating an unbalanced panel. 
The list of sample countries for which sovereign credit ratings are available is 
provided in table A2 of Appendix A.  
 
 
 
                                              
24
 Available at http://www.wsjprimerate.us/libor/libor_rates_history.htm#liborpreviousmonth. Data are 
also available at http://www.fedprimerate.com/libor/libor_rates_history.htm. 
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4. Empirical issues and estimation methodology 
4.1 Empirical issues 
 There are two major empirical issues that we take into account. First, due to 
the stock nature of the dependent variable, non-stationarity is a likely empirical issue. 
We conducted an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the total debt stock and its PPG 
and PNG components. The unit root null hypothesis was rejected at the 1 percent 
level, whether an intercept, or an intercept with a trend are included in the regression. 
The null hypothesis was also rejected for the total debt stock and PPG in per capita 
terms. For PNG per capita, we failed to reject the unit root null at the 10 percent 
significance level; when the variable was first differenced, the null was rejected. 
 Unit root tests were also undertaken for the explanatory variables. For all but 
imports of goods and services relative to GDP, the unit root null hypothesis was 
rejected indicating stationarity. The unit root null hypothesis was rejected when the 
variable was first differenced. 
 Second, simultaneity is a potential issue. Thus Granger causality tests have 
been conducted. Test results for two lag lengths are reported in table 1 below, with 
arrows specifying direction of causality. Results also show for four lag length that 
total debt stock, PPG, and PPG per capita Granger cause total signed treaties with 
OECD countries. To address non-stationarity and endogeneity arising from 
simultaneity, we adopt a system GMM approach as explained in the following 
section.  
 
 
 
 
17 
 
TABLE 1 
Granger Causality Test Results 
(1) 
Total 
Debt 
(2) 
PPG 
(3) 
PNG 
(4) 
Total 
Debt 
(5) 
PPG 
(6) 
PNG 
(7) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
   Per capita  
           Total number of 
signed bilateral 
investment treaties 
with OECD 
            Sovereign Credit 
Rating  
            12-month 
Eurodollar LIBOR 
          Percentage of 
imports of goods 
and services to GDP 
 Notes: Table shows the dependent variable(s) on the first 6 column(s), and the explanatory 
variables on the last (right hand side) column. A right arrow ( ) indicates flow of Granger 
causality from dependent variable. A left arrow ( ) indicates flow of Granger causality from 
explanatory variable. A right-left arrow ( ) indicates bidirectional flow of Granger causality. 
Statistically significant results at only 1% and 5% levels are reported. Variables are not log 
transformed. 
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4.2 Estimation methodology   
 To address endogeneity, we adopt a dynamic panel GMM approach in 
estimating the empirical model along the line of Arellano and Bond (1991).
25
 To 
explain the GMM estimator, consider the following empirical model: 
tiitititi vXyy ,,1,,     i = 1,…, N t = 1,…, T (2) 
where yi,t is the dependent variable and Xi,t is the vector of explanatory variables, and 
the subscripts i and t denote country and time periods. The error term comprises 
unobservable country effect, i , in addition to a disturbance term tiv , . The lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the country effect i and thus the error term μi + 
νi,t To eliminate the unobservable country effect, the GMM estimator takes the first 
difference: 
titititi vXyy ,,1,,                               (3) 
Although unobservable country effect is eliminated with differencing, there can still 
be an endogneity bias arising from the correlation between the lagged difference of 
the dependent variable and the error term. In this case instrumental variables are used. 
The difference GMM estimator uses the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as 
instruments on the conditions that the error term of the differenced equation is not 
serially correlated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weakly 
exogenous. The moment conditions therefore are written as: 
0)]([ 1,,,   titisti vvyE  for s 2 ; t = 3,…, T   (4) 
0)]([ 1,,,   titisti vvXE  for s 2 ; t = 3,…, T   (5) 
                                              
25
 For recent applications of GMM estimators see for example Che et al (2012), Sen et al (2007), and 
Rioja and Valev (2004).  
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 When the dependent variable is highly persistent over time, the difference 
GMM suffers weak instrument problem and its asymptotic properties may be affected. 
In this case Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) the difference 
GMM estimator is augmented with estimation of the levels equation (equation 2) to 
produce system GMM estimator. For this equation, lagged differences of explanatory 
variables are used as instruments, assuming the absence of serial correlation in the 
error term, and between these instruments and the error term. The moment conditions 
are thus written as:  
0)]([ ,,   tiisti vyE   for s=1  (6) 
0)]([ ,,   tiisti vXE   for s=1  (7) 
To ensure that the moment conditions (4-7) are satisfied, we test the lack of second-
order serial correlation and use the Hansen/Sargan tests of over-identifying 
restrictions to test for instrument validity. 
 
 5. Empirical results 
 Table 2 provides mean debt stock for the sample countries. Among the middle 
income countries, Russia has the highest level of total debt, whether PPG or PNG. Its 
total debt amount for about $205 billion, of which $112 billion or 55 percent is PPG. 
On the other extreme, Botswana has the lowest level of debt stock of $0.54 billion, of 
which $0.51 billion or 94 percent in PPG. The highest percentage of PNG debt is in 
Kazakhstan with 82 percent. In per capita terms, Latvia has the highest total and PNG 
debt at about $5,700 and $2,700, respectively, while Panama has the highest PPG debt 
at about $1,900. In contrast, India and China have the lowest total and PPG debt at 
nearly $100 and $50, respectively. Among the low income countries, Bangladesh has 
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the highest average of nearly $14 billion, of which nearly $13 billion or 93 percent is 
PPG. The highest share of PNG debt is in Mozambique, which stands at 12 percent.  
 
Table 3, 4, and 5 present the estimation results using OLS, fixed effects, and 
the two-step system GMM estimation respectively. All estimates show high 
persistence in debt. OLS estimates show positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of political risk guarantee and default risk. For example in column 1 an 
increase in the number of treaties by 1 increases debt accumulation by US$ 0.4 
billion, and an improvement in sovereign credit rating score by 1 increases it by 
US$1.4 billion. An increase in the cost of loanable funds reduces total and PPG debt 
stock and in per capita terms as well. 
Compared to OLS estimates, the fixed effects coefficients of political risk 
guarantees are statistically significant only in total and per capita PNG debt. An 
improvement in default risk increases total and PNG debt accumulation only. The 
negative and statistically significant effect of costs of loanable funds is experienced 
also for total and PNG debt only.  
The system GMM estimation methodology is valid as suggested by the results 
of the Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation, the Hansen J statistic, and the difference 
Hansen J statistic. The Arellano-Bond test of autocorrelation (AR2) suggests that 
there is no autocorrelation of order 2 in the error term. Testing for over-identifying 
restrictions, the Hansen J statistic suggests that the instruments, as a group, are 
uncorrelated with the error term, and thus appear exogenous, and the difference 
Hansen J statistic suggests that there is no correlation between the lagged differences 
of the explanatory variables and the error terms. We should note that due to the 
proliferation of instruments, we are reporting system GMM estimates, which are 
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based on collapsing instruments, similar to Che et al (2012) who follow Roodman 
(2009). 
GMM estimates of the lagged dependent variable are closer to the OLS than to 
the fixed effects estimates for total and PPG debt (and in per capita terms). The 
coefficients of PNG debt and PNG debt per capita are very different, however. For the 
former, it exceeds 1 and for the latter it is close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
The coefficients of political risk guarantee are much higher than the OLS and fixed 
effects coefficients. For example, an increase in the total number of bilateral 
investment treaties increases total and PPG debt by US$3.4 billion and US$ 2.3 
billion, respectively, compared to OLS of US$ 0.4 billion and US$ 0.3 billion. 
For default risk coefficients, GMM estimates stand in striking difference 
from the OLS and fixed effects estimates. All of them are negative and most of 
them are statistically insignificant. 
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TABLE 2  
Debt in Low and Middle Income Countries 
    Per Capita 
 Total 
Debt 
PPG PNG Total 
Debt 
PPG PNG 
 Low income 
Bangladesh 13.89 12.87 0.00 113.75 105.28 0.00 
Burkina Faso 1.15 1.04 0.00 98.66 89.11 0.00 
Kenya 6.10 4.76 0.34 223.91 170.74 15.16 
Mozambique 4.87 3.75 0.60 292.74 228.64 34.61 
Uganda 2.64 2.27 0.00 121.47 102.64 0.00 
       
 Middle income 
Albania 1.63 1.06 0.21 516.59 337.09 65.43 
Angola 10.80 9.07 0.00 772.79 650.97 0.00 
Argentina 94.22 55.70 16.42 2635.36 1564.22 452.31 
Azerbaijan 1.93 1.23 0.22 221.31 141.55 24.85 
Belarus 5.73 1.67 0.55 587.00 170.69 56.96 
Bolivia 4.94 3.59 0.83 662.71 492.90 96.90 
Botswana 0.54 0.51 0.00 341.15 324.18 0.00 
Brazil 173.11 84.67 58.83 1040.38 525.44 336.60 
Bulgaria 14.54 6.54 4.06 1829.87 788.19 533.73 
Cameroon 6.49 5.32 0.39 462.89 377.26 28.58 
Chile 32.49 8.65 17.18 2177.46 619.40 1118.62 
China 152.14 64.32 25.37 121.05 52.45 19.71 
Colombia 26.95 17.11 6.04 698.76 446.82 150.28 
Costa Rica 4.92 3.19 0.60 1396.66 939.63 156.78 
Dominican 
Republic 
5.37 4.03 0.20 652.63 491.56 23.67 
Ecuador 13.05 9.40 1.78 1139.74 828.02 140.22 
Egypt 32.42 28.14 0.47 533.96 459.26 8.28 
El Salvador 4.38 2.86 0.78 750.34 494.67 128.75 
Ghana 4.62 3.50 0.07 258.60 194.42 4.21 
Guatemala 5.22 2.65 1.68 457.39 248.42 128.84 
Honduras 3.92 3.12 0.33 696.96 559.61 53.90 
India 101.58 63.29 25.58 98.68 64.05 22.31 
Indonesia 98.72 54.99 25.70 473.81 267.16 119.97 
Jamaica 5.41 4.04 0.49 2140.31 1606.29 181.43 
Jordan 6.61 5.64 0.00 1593.85 1351.34 0.00 
Kazakhstan 35.63 2.57 29.15 2292.37 167.36 1872.67 
Latvia 13.13 1.43 6.13 5732.99 622.80 2686.77 
Lebanon 8.88 6.70 0.34 2265.50 1684.36 87.08 
Lithuania 10.57 3.00 4.64 3117.31 881.36 1373.73 
Malaysia 35.39 16.78 10.19 1582.03 788.24 436.80 
Mexico 134.36 83.92 25.36 1438.92 906.58 260.82 
Mongolia 1.12 0.98 0.02 440.78 386.05 6.63 
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    Per Capita 
 Total 
Debt 
PPG PNG Total 
Debt 
PPG PNG 
Morocco 19.62 17.03 1.12 741.29 645.55 38.30 
Nigeria 23.90 19.74 0.44 221.94 182.69 4.96 
Pakistan 27.56 22.56 1.18 205.48 167.77 8.14 
Panama 6.75 5.15 0.52 2480.92 1859.68 169.30 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2.27 1.27 0.82 482.14 270.32 174.17 
Paraguay 2.57 1.74 0.33 520.39 361.85 62.07 
Peru 23.81 16.21 2.90 978.23 668.61 109.80 
Philippines 43.89 26.68 9.84 607.59 368.25 125.90 
Russia 204.48 112.37 61.85 1409.86 771.13 430.43 
Senegal 3.30 2.76 0.07 398.01 330.60 7.44 
Serbia 17.89 8.60 6.30 3239.96 903.90 1871.75 
South Africa 30.35 12.14 7.03 656.04 262.60 150.11 
Sri Lanka 8.15 6.83 0.25 433.53 363.25 12.70 
Thailand 49.52 14.84 17.70 805.14 245.29 284.87 
Tunisia 11.22 8.71 0.73 1222.61 959.59 76.56 
Turkey 101.58 47.33 29.26 1582.27 767.89 428.74 
Ukraine 34.31 8.95 14.22 734.75 187.63 308.45 
Uruguay 6.55 4.82 0.19 2016.71 1483.80 58.14 
Venezuela 38.73 24.93 4.67 1782.98 1127.87 226.15 
Vietnam 16.09 13.94 0.00 208.51 181.19 0.00 
Zambia 5.41 3.74 0.22 625.58 431.03 19.44 
Notes: Debt, PPG and PNG are measured in current US$ billion, while the 
per capita measures are in current US$. 
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TABLE 3 
Debt Stocks, Political Risk Guarantees and Default Risk: OLS 
Dependent variable: log (Debt in US$ billion) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Debt PPG PNG Debt/Capita PPG/Capita PNG/Capita 
       
Lagged dependent 0.986a 0.978a 0.889a 0.991a 0.992a 0.933a 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.039) (0.007) (0.008) (0.027) 
P 0.004a 0.003b 0.011c 0.004a 0.003b 0.015b 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
D 0.014a 0.008c 0.058a 0.013a 0.006 0.041c 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) (0.023) 
I -0.003 -0.011a 0.040b -0.004 -0.012a 0.048b 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.020) (0.004) (0.003) (0.020) 
M 0.000 -0.000 -0.003c 0.001a 0.001b 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.024 0.059c -0.246 -0.034 0.023 -0.173 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.210) (0.058) (0.056) (0.256) 
       
Obs. 701 701 701 696 696 696 
F statistic 7437 7562 203 4708 4388 313 
R-squared 0.988 0.984 0.854 0.976 0.966 0.894 
Notes: P is the rate of political risk guarantee, proxied by the total number of bilateral investment 
treaties signed with OECD countries. D is the rate of default on loans measured by S&P sovereign credit 
rating. I is the cost of loanable funds measured by 12-month Euro dollar LIBOR. M is the cost of 
exclusion from international capital markets proxied by percentage of imports of goods and services to 
GDPG. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, 
respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
Debt Stocks Political Risk Guarantees and Default Risk: Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable: log (Debt in US$ billion) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Debt PPG PNG Debt/Capita PPG/Capita PNG/Capita 
       
Lagged dependent 0.881a 0.794a 0.692a 0.881a 0.800a 0.676a 
 (0.021) (0.041) (0.081) (0.022) (0.041) (0.084) 
P 0.001 0.001 0.029c -0.000 -0.001 0.035c 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.018) 
D 0.020a 0.001 0.107a 0.019a 0.002 0.118a 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.037) (0.006) (0.005) (0.034) 
I -0.013a -0.022a 0.021 -0.013a -0.020a 0.022 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) 
M 0.002b -0.001 0.006 0.002c -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
Constant 0.262a 0.655a -0.810a 0.714a 1.398a 0.379 
 (0.084) (0.106) (0.288) (0.159) (0.253) (0.304) 
       
Obs. 701 701 701 696 696 696 
R-squared (within) 0.890 0.746 0.608 0.878 0.725 0.619 
F test 873 210 129 625 128 119 
Number of 
countries 
57 57 57 57 57 57 
Notes: P is the rate of political risk guarantee, proxied by the total number of bilateral 
investment treaties signed with OECD countries. D is the rate of default on loans measured by 
S&P sovereign credit rating. I is the cost of loanable funds measured by 12-month Euro dollar 
LIBOR. M is the cost of exclusion from international capital markets proxied by percentage 
of imports of goods and services to GDPG. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. a, b, c 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
Debt Stocks, Political Risk Guarantees and Default Risk: 
Two-Step System GMM 
Dependent variable: log (Debt in US$ billion) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Debt PPG PNG Debt/Capita PPG/Capita PNG/Capita 
       
Lagged dependent 0.964a 0.939a 1.027a 0.962a 0.946a 0.013 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.057) (0.112) (0.110) (0.394) 
P 0.034a 0.023b 0.003 0.059a 0.060a 0.523b 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.025) (0.018) (0.020) (0.265) 
D -0.015 0.009 -0.020 -0.052b -0.073c 0.305 
 (0.040) (0.031) (0.069) (0.021) (0.039) (0.294) 
I 0.010 -0.010 0.070 0.008 -0.009 0.104 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.058) (0.008) (0.009) (0.096) 
M 0.002 -0.000 0.008 0.010b 0.009 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.029) 
Constant -0.277b -0.084 -0.393 -0.515 -0.264 -3.842 
 (0.135) (0.141) (0.752) (0.713) (0.782) (2.779) 
       
Obs. 401 401 401 399 399 399 
Instruments 65 65 65 66 66 66 
Wald test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
AR(2) 0.902 0.245 0.302 0.643 0.122 0.369 
Hansen J test 0.915 0.909 0.851 0.924 0.880 0.956 
GMM Instruments       
  Hansen J test 0.882 0.823 0.850 0.937 0.921 0.960 
  Difference Hansen J test 0.966 1.000 0.406 0.280 0.141 0.371 
IV       
  Hansen J test 0.904 0.910 0.875 0.913 0.868 0.975 
  Difference Hansen J test 0.568 0.438 0.296 0.580 0.541 0.201 
Number of countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Notes: P is the rate of political risk guarantee, proxied by the total number of bilateral investment 
treaties signed with OECD countries. D is the rate of default on loans measured by S&P sovereign credit 
rating. I is the cost of loanable funds measured by 12-month Euro dollar LIBOR. M is the cost of 
exclusion from international capital markets proxied by percentage of imports of goods and services to 
GDPG. GMM instruments are the lagged dependent variable and the total number of bilateral 
investment treaties signed with OECD countries. IV instruments are the percent of public spending on 
education to GDP, total health expenditures to GDP, and (log) FDI stock. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. a, b, c denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper has started off with the challenge of sustainable large capital 
inflows that emerging markets face in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
starting 2007. To sustain debt flows, it is important to understand its debt 
determinants taking into account the importance of guaranteed debt in debt 
composition and the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties as a means to 
guarantee political risk and promote financial integration. The paper conceptualizes a 
number of mechanisms through which bilateral investment treaties can influence 
international lending. The paper empirically finds that signed bilateral investment 
treaties with OECD countries have a positive influence on total and guaranteed debt 
accumulation, under system GMM and OLS estimation methodologies. 
The results of the paper show creditors extending guaranteed loans positively 
respond to political risk guarantees of bilateral investment treaties, suggesting 
complementarity of guarantees against default and political risk for low and middle 
income countries. The evidence for non-guaranteed loans calls for further 
investigations, however. Finally the results suggest that the role of bilateral 
investment treaties extends beyond attracting FDI to international lending.  
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Appendix A 
S&P Letter Credit Rating Transformation Methodology 
 
 Transforming S&P’s foreign currency, long-term debt credit rating into 
numerical scores follows the scoring system provided in the table below. Foreign 
currency, as opposed to local currency, rating is selected based on the assumption that 
low and middle income countries’ investment and trade finance needs are mostly in 
foreign currency. Long, as opposed to short, term rating is selected due to the long-
term nature of PPG and PNG debt, as discussed in section 4.  S&P ratings are 
obtained from S&P’s “Sovereign Rating And Country T&C Assessment Histories” 
issued on September 10, 2012, which covers historical ratings as of August 31, 
2012.
26
 
The score that a country gets in a given year is the average of assigned ratings 
throughout the year weighted by the number of months for which the rating(s) held. 
For example, if a country was assigned “AAA” rating for any six months during the 
year, and “AA” for the remaining six months, the numerical score is 9.5, which is 
calculated as [10*(6/12)]+[9*(6/12)]. 
We should note that counting the number of months to which a rating is 
assigned is inclusive of that month. For example, if an “A” rating is assigned in 
March and lasts until December of the same year, then the rating applies to 10 
months. Also, if for any given month two different scores is assigned, the score that 
lasts for more number of days applies to that month. 
Unlike Kim and Wu (2008) and Gande and Parsley (2005), we do not account 
for outlook in rating transformation. This is for two reasons. First, if the outlook is 
realized and therefore reflected in the next rating, the weighted average scoring 
methodology will account for the realized outlook. Second, the majority of low 
                                              
26
 I am very grateful to Marie Cavanaugh of Standard & Poors for sharing with me such data. 
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income countries and nearly half of middle income countries foreign debt is PPG, the 
response of which to sovereign rating is statistically insignificant.  
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TABLE A1 
S&P Credit Ratings and Scores 
S&P Credit Rating  Numerical Score 
AAA 10 
AA 9 
A 8 
BBB 7 
BB 6 
B 5 
CCC 4 
CC 3 
C 2 
D 1 
SD 0 
Notes: “+/-” raises/reduces the score by 0.33. For example, an “A-” is 7.67, while a “BBB+” 
is 7.33. 
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Table A2: Sample countries with Average S&P Scores 
Country Period Average 
S&P 
Score 
Country Period Average 
S&P 
Score 
Middle Income      
Albania 2010-2012 5.3 Mexico 1992-2012 6.6 
Angola 2010-2012 5.6 Mongolia 1999-2012 4.9 
Argentina 1993-2012 4.6 Morocco 1998-2012 6.2 
Azerbaijan 2008-2012 6.5 Nigeria 2006-2012 5.4 
Belarus 2007-2012 5.2 Pakistan 1994-2012 4.5 
Bolivia 1998-2012 5.0 Panama 1997-2012 6.3 
Botswana 2001-2012 7.9 Papua New 
Guinea 
1999-2012 5.2 
Brazil 1994-2012 5.8 Paraguay 1995-2012 4.6 
Bulgaria 1998-2012 6.4 Peru 1997-2012 5.8 
Cameroon 2003-2012 4.4 Philippines 1993-2012 6.0 
Chile 1993-2012 7.6 Russia 1996-2012 5.4 
China 1992-2012 7.5 Senegal 2000-2012 5.3 
Colombia 1993-2012 6.2 Serbia 2004-2012 5.2 
Costa Rica 1997-2012 5.8 South Africa 1994-2012 6.6 
Dominican Republic 1997-2012 4.9 Sri Lanka 2005-2012 4.6 
Ecuador 2000-2012 4.1 Thailand 1989-2012 7.2 
Egypt 1997-2012 6.3 Tunisia 1997-2012 6.7 
El Salvador 1996-2012 6.0 Turkey 1992-2012 5.4 
Ghana 2003-2012 4.9 Ukraine 2001-2012 4.9 
Guatemala 2001-2012 5.6 Uruguay 1994-2012 5.7 
Honduras 2008-2012 4.3 Venezuela 1980-2012 5.9 
India 1990-2012 6.2 Vietnam 2002-2012 5.6 
Indonesia 1992-2012 5.3 Zambia 2011-2012 4.9 
Jamaica 1999-2012 4.9    
Jordan 1995-2012 5.6 Low Income   
Kazakhstan 1996-2012 6.0 Bangladesh 2010-2012 5.7 
Latvia 1997-2012 7.0 Burkina 
Faso 
2004-2012 5.0 
Lebanon 1997-2012 5.0 Kenya 2006-2012 4.7 
Lithuania 1997-2012 7.0 Mozambique 2004-2012 5.2 
Malaysia 1989-2012 7.7 Uganda 2008-2012 4.4 
Notes: Although credit ratings data end in 2012, sample period ends in 2010 with the end of 
WDI online data.    
 
